“Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions”

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1976, p. 240.


The issues related to ‘hybrid warfare’ have dominated the recent news feeds, political and military scholarship and particularly international security agenda worldwide.  According to the Uppsala conflict data set, there were 118 armed conflicts worldwide between 1989 and 2004, 76 percent (90) of which were purely internal, 6 percent (7) – purely interstate, and the rest were the mixture of both (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). Still, the term ‘hybrid warfare’ has only recently been addressed as a separate concept, despite the claims of it being a ‘nature-changing’ means of warfare. Commonly understood as the combination of Hybrid warfare: how hybridized actors distort the course and outcomes of warsunconventional and conventional military and non-military tactics, it cannot be addressed by sheer conventional military strategies. This is particularly evident from the experiences of global military powers engaged in conflicts, which they prematurely consider as ‘quick wars’ but later realize that the conventional military means and strategies fail to work the way they used to in traditional wars (for instance, USA in Iraq and Afghanistan). 

Due to the fact that the current literature embraces a profound number of studies related to the comprehensive examination of the strategies and tactics addressing the hybrid threat, the multiple hybridized actors and their ideological, ethnic or predatory forces that drive them to engage have not been given such a thorough attention. 


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